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BARGAINING IN THE SHADOW OF THE EUROPEAN
MICROSOFT DECISION: THE MICROSOFTSAMBA PROTOCOL LICENSE
William H. Page* & Seldon J. Childers**

INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 2004, the European Commission (EC) held that Microsoft had abused its dominant position under Article 82 of the European
Community Treaty1 by, among other actions, refusing Sun Microsystems’
request for information that Sun needed to interoperate with Windows
workgroup server products.2 The EC ordered Microsoft to disclose “complete and accurate specifications for the protocols used by Windows work
group servers in order to provide file, print, and group and user administration [i.e., directory] services to Windows work group networks.”3 On September 17, 2007, the European Court of First Instance (CFI) affirmed the
EC’s liability ruling and its remedial order.4 About a month later, Microsoft’s CEO, Steve Ballmer, reached an agreement with the head of the EC’s
competition authority, Neelie Kroes, on the terms under which Microsoft
would license the protocols.5 In December 2007, with the active encour*

Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar, University of Florida Levin College of Law. The authors
wish to thank David Heiner and Craig Shank of Microsoft and Eben Moglen of Columbia Law School
and the Software Freedom Law Center for discussing these issues with us. The title of our paper is inspired, of course, by Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). We again thank Eben Moglen for suggesting the analogy.
**
J.D., University of Florida Levin College of Law, 2008; software developer and management
consultant, 1993–2004.
1
Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 82, 2006 O.J. (C
321E)
1,
available
at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/ce321/ce32120061229en00010331.pdf (link).
2
Case COMP/C-3/37.792, Microsoft v. Comm’n, European Commission Decision ¶¶ 779–91 [hereinafter
Microsoft,
EC
Decision],
available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/cases/decisions/37792/en.pdf (link).
3
Id. ¶ 999.
4
Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 WL 2693858 ¶¶ 1329–30, 1364 (Sept. 17,
2007),
available
at
http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgibin/form.pl?lang=EN&Submit=rechercher&numaff=T-201/04 (under the “Cases” column and in the
row with “Judgment,” follow the “T-201/04” link) (link).
5
See Steve Lohr & Kevin J. O’Brien, Microsoft Is Yielding in European Antitrust Fight, N.Y.
TIMES,
October
23,
2007,
at
C1,
available
at
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agement of the EC, Microsoft reached a licensing agreement for the covered
protocols with Samba, an open source development project that produces
server software that emulates the behavior of Microsoft’s server operating
systems.6 The parties have begun to implement the agreement.7
The Microsoft-Samba agreement is by far the most important tangible
outcome of the European Microsoft case. The EC’s other remedial order in
the case, which required Microsoft to create a version of Windows without
Windows Media Player, was an embarrassing failure.8 Immediately after
the Ballmer-Kroes agreement, some anticipated a similar fate for the remedial order addressing Microsoft’s refusal to supply rivals in the workgroup
server market.9 The Samba agreement, however, is significant because it
requires Microsoft to provide, to its most important rival in the server market, detailed documentation of its communications protocols, under terms
that allow use of the information in open source development and distribution. There is good reason to believe that Samba will be able to use the information to compete more effectively with Microsoft because Samba’s
development methods depend specifically on analysis of communications
protocols. In a closely related development, Microsoft has now published
all of the covered protocols on its website.10 While these actions will certainly enhance interoperability, they may also facilitate cloning and thus
devalue Microsoft’s intellectual property. Thus, it remains unclear whether
the license will enhance or inhibit dynamic, innovative competition in the
long run.
In this short Article, we assess what the Microsoft-Samba license
might mean, both for the market and for antitrust policy. In doing so, we
rely on published sources and on interviews with some of the key players in
the negotiations. On the Microsoft side, we spoke to David Heiner, Microsoft’s lead in-house antitrust counsel, and to Craig Shank, its lead negotiator
for the Samba license. On Samba’s side, we spoke to Eben Moglen, a prohttp://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/23/technology/23soft.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1&ref=business&oref
=slogin (link).
6
Microsoft Work Group Server Protocol Program License Agreement (No Patents) for Development
and
Product
Distribution
(2007),
available
at
http://www.protocolfreedom.org/PFIF_agreement.pdf (link); see infra Part III.
7
Telephone interview with Eben Moglen, Professor of Law, Columbia Law School, Founding Director, Software Freedom Law Center (Feb. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Moglen Interview]; Telephone interview with Craig Shank, General Manager, Competition Law Compliance Team, Microsoft Corporation
(Dec. 27, 2007) [hereinafter Shank Interview].
8
See William H. Page, Mandatory Contracting Remedies in the American and European Microsoft
Cases, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 18, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1073103 (link)) (describing the failure of the EC-mandated versions of Windows to attract users).
9
See, e.g., Posting of Steven J. Vaughan Nichols to Linux-Watch, http://www.linuxwatch.com/news/NS8933238190.html (Oct. 25, 2007) (link).
10
Microsoft Developer Network, Open Protocol Specifications, http://msdn.microsoft.com/enus/library/cc203350.aspx (last visited May 30, 2008) (link).
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fessor at Columbia Law School, whose Software Freedom Law Center provided legal representation for Samba. In Part I, we briefly describe the
function of servers and communications protocols in computer networks.
We then discuss the special significance of the Samba project in the server
market. Part II summarizes the reasoning of the EC and CFI in the workgroup server side of the European Microsoft case. Part III describes the negotiations that produced the agreement and spells out the terms of the
resulting license. In Part IV, we consider the possible implications of the
license and the disclosure process for Samba, Microsoft, and competition
policy.
I. SERVERS, PROTOCOLS, MICROSOFT, AND SAMBA
Most organizations and businesses of any size maintain computer networks in which server computers perform tasks for users of linked client
computers. Both the server hardware and the client hardware are typically
manufactured by vendors like Dell, IBM, or HP. In some networks the
servers and clients run operating systems from a single vendor,11 but in
most, the servers run a variety of operating systems while the clients run
some version of Windows.12 Communications protocols allow the computers on all of these networks to interoperate.13 They provide rules that
govern what, when, and how information is transmitted between servers
and client computers as well as between different servers within the same
network. Some protocols are industry standards and can be used to implement a variety of functions; others are tailored to the specific needs of the
server’s underlying functionality. The protocols thus amount to a language
that allows users to request and receive a variety of services, including
printing, saving on a network drive, displaying Web pages, and sending and
receiving email. The language also enables the servers on the network to
perform “directory services,” that is, essential authentication and security
functions.14
In the mid 1990s, Novell was the leader in software that performed the
file and print sharing functions of corporate networks, while Unix servers,
often on the same network, typically controlled other applications like databases and email. Microsoft’s server products began to gain a larger share of
these markets during the 1990s and have now achieved substantial, if not
11
See TERESA C. MANN PILIOURAS, NETWORK DESIGN: MANAGEMENT AND TECHNICAL
PERSPECTIVES 356 (2004).
12
See id.
13
See William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Software Development as an Antitrust Remedy: Lessons from the Enforcement of the Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing Requirement, 14 Mich.
Telecomm.
&
Tech.
L.
Rev.
77,
91–93
(2007),
available
at
http://www.mttlr.org/volfourteen/page&childers.pdf (link).
14
Id. at 104 & nn.179 & 181. The EC decision against Microsoft focused on file, print, and directory services. See Microsoft, EC Decision, supra note 2.
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dominant, shares in some segments.15 Microsoft’s Active Directory, which
controls directory functions, is one of Microsoft’s most distinctive and innovative server technologies16 and was the focus of Sun’s original demand
for what the EC later called “interoperability information.”17
Today, the most important non-Microsoft technology in the server
market is Samba, which emulates the behavior of Windows server products,
but runs on Linux, a widely adopted open source server operating system.18
Samba is available under version 3 of the GNU General Public License
(GPLv3).19 It allows a variety of Unix-based and Linux-based operating
systems to connect to Windows clients and servers. Significantly, however,
the Samba project has not yet been able fully to emulate Active Directory.
This shortfall became a key issue in the EC’s liability ruling and in the remedial discussions, which we discuss below.
Because of its origins and characteristic methods of development,
Samba is in a better position than most of Microsoft’s rivals to benefit from
the EC’s remedial order. In 1991, Andrew Tridgell, a computer science
Ph.D. student at the Australian National University, wanted his MS-DOS
workstation to connect reliably to a Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC)
server.20 By writing code that “spied” on the communications between the
server and clients, Tridgell discovered that the DEC server was using a freely available standard industry configuration known as SMB over Netbios.
With this knowledge, he was able to write and implement the first predecessor of Samba, which he posted on a few bulletin boards and newsgroups.21
In the process of uncovering the protocols, Tridgell began to develop the
skills in network packet decryption that are the foundation of the Samba
project. Two years later, Tridgell adapted his software to provide
SMB/Netbios services on Linux.22 Tridgell’s server management system
was ideally suited to Linux because it allowed connection from other Unix
and MS-DOS workstations. The software that would later become known
as Samba began to accompany most Linux distributions.

15

See MITCH TULLOCH, WINDOWS SERVER HACKS xix (2004).
Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 WL 2693858 ¶190 (Sept. 17, 2007), (quoting
Microsoft’s reply).
17
Microsoft, EC Decision, supra note 2, ¶ 33; see infra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
18
See generally STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004) (describing the evolution
of Linux).
19
GNU General Public License, ver. 3 (June 29, 2007), http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.txt (link).
See also Samba, Home Page, http://samba.org (link).
20
Andrew Tridgell and the Samba Team, A Bit of History and a Bit of Fun (1997),
http://www.rxn.com/services/faq/smb/samba.history.txt (link).
21
See id.
22
Id. In fact, the name “Samba” was derived from a computer search Andrew ran for words containing the letters S, M, and B (i.e. SMB/Netbios). Id.
16
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Jeremy Allison of Great Britain joined Tridgell’s project in 1993 and
others followed.23 The team continued to use Tridgell’s development methods to map Windows client and server communications,24 a process that was
simplified by the fact that Microsoft’s server products also spoke the industry-standard SMB/Netbios. Once the Samba source code was placed into a
popular open source code repository, development accelerated. The Samba
team devoted significant resources to building competent online documentation. As a result, the solution rapidly became the essential workgroup
server solution in almost every Linux distribution and Linux-based network
device.
Samba is now the de facto standard for most non-Microsoft networkenabled products, and not only computers. Because Samba is free, firms
using it can sell devices more cheaply than if the maker were required to
purchase a license for Windows and Windows server for each unit sold.
Samba also offers permissive licensing terms, ease of installation and configuration, compatibility with Linux/Unix, and access to Samba developers
for support.25 Most important, because Samba is open source, device makers who need a particular feature added to Samba to make their device work
properly can make the change to the Samba software itself.26
Obvious benefactors of the Samba project are Microsoft’s major competitors in the workgroup server market, including IBM, Apple, Sun, and
Novell, all of which now use Samba as the engine for their proprietary
workgroup server solutions.27 All add proprietary extensions that provide
additional features and tools for managing the network.28 Their solutions
23
See John Blair, Virtual Interview with Jeremy Allison and Andrew Tridgell, LINUX J., June 1,
1998, http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/2900 (link).
24
See id.
25
See, e.g., The Samba Archives, http://lists.samba.org/archive/samba/ (last visited May 30, 2008)
(link). This represents but one of many online community-based support venues available to developers
and users of Samba at no cost.
26
The source code for the Samba system, as well as for client software, development tools, and administration interfaces, is available for public download on the Samba site. Samba Download Page,
http://devel.samba.org/samba/download/ (last visited May 30, 2008) (link).
27
See All About Microsoft, http://blogs.zdnet.com/microsoft/?p=725 (Sept. 20 2007, 10:13 EST)
(quoting Jeremy Allison). The Samba license permits commercial products to incorporate the Samba
source code without paying any licensing or royalties fees (essentially free). In return, a commercial
producer of a product incorporating Samba must agree to publish any changes (improvements) that are
made to the Samba source code. See GNU General Public License ver. 3, supra note 19. Novell made a
separate agreement with Microsoft in 2006 regarding licensing of server technologies that is similar to
the Microsoft-Samba agreement, but that provides licenses to all relevant Microsoft patents. See Microsoft, Microsoft and Novell Announce Broad Collaboration on Windows and Linux Interoperability and
PRESSPASS,
Nov.
2,
2006,
Support,
MICROSOFT
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2006/nov06/11-02MSNovellPR.mspx (link). That license
has been controversial in the open source community. See, e.g., Novell Sells Out, GROKLAW, Nov. 2.
2006, http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=20061102175508403 (link).
28
Samba does not provide any particular user interface for configuring the network. In fact, all
Samba configuration options are managed in a single text file. There is no user interface per se. There-
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are automatically compatible with Windows-based networks. Because they
start with a complete networking solution, they can focus their significant
resources on value-added features. In return, these competitors support the
Samba project by employing key members of the Samba team to continue
their open source work on a full-time basis. Tridgell is currently employed
by IBM. Jeremy Allison has worked at HP and Novell and is currently at
Google, with the remarkable title of “Linux Evangelist.”29
Thus, Samba is both a clone of Windows server products and something more. It is a distinctive technology with a host of features, some of
which are inferior to the corresponding features of Microsoft’s server solutions, and some of which are superior. Samba has fueled a significant sector of the technology economy and has enabled the development of entirely
new categories of devices.
II. THE EUROPEAN MICROSOFT DECISION, PROTOCOL LICENSING,
AND SAMBA
Microsoft has instituted protocol licensing programs under both the
American and European antitrust remedies, but Samba has obtained a license only under the EC program. The different outcome stems from the
broader goals of the EC program in the server market. In this Part, we first
distinguish the goals of the two remedial programs, then examine the European rulings on refusal to supply, and finally describe the agreement between Neelie Kroes and Steve Ballmer on the terms under which Microsoft
must license its protocols.
A. Two Approaches to Regulating Interoperability
The U.S. program has been an enormous undertaking for both Microsoft and government enforcement officials.30 It has resulted in greatly improved documentation of Microsoft’s protocols, particularly after a critical
“reset” of the program in the spring of 2006.31 The process, however, has
been extraordinarily difficult, with little apparent benefit to rivals or compefore, companies offering Samba-based solutions differentiate themselves by supplying proprietary traditional user interfaces offering configuration and management of the network, running on their respective
platforms.
29
See Jeremy Allison’s LinkedIn public profile, http://www.linkedin.com/in/jeremyallison (last visited May 30, 2008) (link).
30
Although network computing had little to do with the merits of the U.S. case, the government insisted that the consent decree include a provision requiring Microsoft to license and disclose interoperability information for the communication protocols that Microsoft client operating systems use to
communicate with Microsoft server operating systems. The government was concerned that Microsoft
would use secret protocols in its client operating systems to enable them to interoperate better with Microsoft server operating systems than with rivals from other vendors. That advantage would also potentially injure middleware applications that run on the rival’s servers, applications that might evolve into
rival platforms. See Page & Childers, supra note 13, at 93–102.
31
See id. at 121.
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tition.32 Part of the reason for the program’s scant results has been its limited rationale, which stemmed from the theory of the government’s case.
Because the American case focused on Microsoft’s efforts to thwart the
“middleware threat” posed by Netscape’s browser and Sun’s Java technologies, the protocol remedy was only designed to foster the emergence of
middleware on servers that would rival the Windows client operating system as a platform.33 Thus, the judgment was not intended directly to benefit
producers of rival server operating systems.34 It did not, for example, require the licensing of protocols used for server-to-server communications,
which would be necessary for the Samba project. Moreover, because the
U.S. decree recognized that Microsoft is entitled to charge a license fee for
its software patents,35 it was not, in its original form, useful to open source
developers like Samba, which reject software patents.36
The “refusal to supply” portion of the EC’s case, by contrast, was focused on competition among server operating systems from the outset.37
The case arose out of Microsoft’s refusal of Sun Microsystems’ 1998 request for detailed specifications of Microsoft’s then-new Active Directory
technology.38 Samba made only a cameo appearance in the EC’s 2004 liability ruling.39 By the time the case reached the Court of First Instance,
however, Sun and some other rivals of Microsoft had reached settlements
with Microsoft that took them out of the proceedings,40 while Samba technology had become the core of the server products of many of Microsoft’s
rivals. Thus, both the arguments before the CFI and the implementation of
the order addressed Samba and its inability (yet) to function as a domain
controller performing Active Directory functions. As a result, representa32

See id. at 126–36.
See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144, 189–92 (D.D.C. 2002); see also Page
& Childers, supra note 13, at 105–08.
34
In the remedy proceedings, the trial court considered various alleged bad acts by Microsoft in the
server market, but found them only tangentially related to the liability rulings in the government case.
New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d 76, 138–44 (D.D.C. 2002).
35
For a discussion of current status of software patents, see Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent
Scope: A Report from the Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (2007).
36
See Posting of Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols to Linux-Watch, http://www.linuxwatch.com/news/NS4465262350.html (Apr. 9, 2008) (link). Microsoft has recently gone beyond the
requirements of the final judgments by publishing the protocols online and relaxing restrictions on use
of its intellectual property by noncommercial users. See Microsoft Communications Protocol Program,
http://www.microsoft.com/about/legal/intellectualproperty/protocols/mcpp.mspx (last visited May 30,
2008) (link).
37
See Microsoft, EC Decision, supra note 2, ¶¶ 346–47.
38
See id. ¶¶ 185–86.
39
See id. ¶¶ 293–97.
40
See EUROPEAN COMMITTEE FOR INTEROPERABLE SYSTEMS, A HISTORY OF ANTI-TRUST
PROBLEMS: MICROSOFT SETTLEMENTS TO RESOLVE ANTI-TRUST DISPUTES 2003–2007,
http://www.ecis.eu/issues/documents/List_of_Microsoft_Settlements_total.DOC (link). Many of Microsoft’s rivals, especially IBM, are members of ECIS and support its advocacy at the EC.
33
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tives of the Free Software Foundation,41 including Tridgell, Allison, and
Volker Lendecke (a German Samba developer) played a more active role in
the appeal than they had in the original investigation.
B. The EC Liability Ruling
Under EC law, a dominant firm may be required to supply rivals in exceptional circumstances.42 Applying this standard, the EC held that Microsoft had abused its dominant position by refusing to supply Sun with
“interoperability information.”43 Sun had asked Microsoft for “the complete information required to allow [Sun] to provide native support for
the complete set of Active Directory technologies on [Sun’s Unix-based
operating system] Solaris.”44 The EC and the CFI held that Microsoft’s refusal to provide certain interoperability information to Sun—essentially the
communications protocols related to Active Directory, a subset of the
broader category of information that Sun had actually requested45—
constituted exceptional circumstances.
Among other reasons for this result, the EC and CFI found that Microsoft had “disrupted its previous levels of supply” of this interoperability information46 and the information was necessary for rival firms to compete.47
Both of these assigned reasons were linked to Active Directory. Microsoft
had never given anyone detailed interoperability information for Active Directory. It had, however, disclosed Windows source code to help AT&T
develop Advanced Server/Unix (AS/U), which allows a Unix server to
emulate a Windows NT server. Windows NT, however, was an earlier
technology that included only early versions of directory services, not Active Directory.48 Microsoft decided not to update the AS/U license to include Active Directory technology because Active Directory was its
primary competitive advantage over other server operating systems.49 This
choice, according to the EC, departed from Microsoft’s earlier policy of interoperation, and thus cast suspicion on its decision not to give Sun the in-

41

For a description of the Free Software Foundation and its mission and objectives, see Free Software Foundation homepage, http://www.fsf.org (last visited May 30, 2008) (link).
42
See Microsoft, EC Decision, supra note 2, ¶ 550.
43
See id. ¶¶ 779–84.
44
Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 WL 2693858 ¶ 2 (Sept. 17, 2007).
45
See Microsoft, EC Decision, supra note 2, ¶¶ 565–66; Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp., 2007 WL
2693858 ¶ 712.
46
See Microsoft, EC Decision, supra note 2, ¶¶ 578–84; Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp., 2007 WL
2693858 ¶ 308.
47
See Microsoft, EC Decision, supra note 2, ¶¶ 666–92.
48
See MARTY PONIATOWSKI, UNIX USER’S HANDBOOK ch. 29 (2d. ed. 2002). AT&T later licensed
the AS/U technology to most major UNIX vendors, who provide what is essentially a “house brand” of
the software that integrates with their own UNIX operating system products.
49
Microsoft, EC Decision, supra note 2, ¶¶ 211–17.
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teroperability information for Active Directory.50 In support of its finding
that access to Microsoft’s protocols was necessary for rivals to compete, the
EC pointed to Samba’s inability to emulate Active Directory.51
One of the most hotly contested issues in the CFI proceedings was
whether the disclosures the EC ordered would result in cloning of Microsoft’s proprietary technology, particularly Active Directory. The EC demanded sufficient disclosures to allow rivals to achieve functional
equivalence with Microsoft’s software,52 including the ability to function as
a “domain controller” for Active Directory services,53 a server that controls
authentication for the network. This goal, the EC insisted, would not allow
rivals “to reproduce [Microsoft’s] ‘interoperability solutions’ [but
only to] achieve an equivalent degree of interoperability by their own
innovative efforts.”54 Microsoft need only disclose the “specifications” of
the functionality that the protocol permits, not its own “implementation” of
that functionality or its source code.55 If disclosures of the specifications allowed the rival to “implement . . . support for the protocols underlying the
Windows domain architecture,” doing so would involve significant “time
and effort.”56 To be competitive, the licensee would have to use the specifications to “innovate” by creating a novel implementation of the Microsoft
server feature set, presumably resulting in advantages. The EC reasoned,
“the interoperability information at issue will be used by Microsoft’s
competitors not to develop exactly the same products as Microsoft’s,
but to develop improved products, with ‘added value.’”57
In response to this reasoning, Microsoft advanced what became known
as the “blue bubble” argument. In the hearings before the CFI in 2006,
John Shewchuk, a senior Microsoft Engineer, argued that servers called
domain controllers, which perform certain integrated operations related to
Active Directory, must not only use the same communications protocols,
but must have the same internal algorithms. He illustrated this point with
the diagram below, in which a blue bubble encloses the domain control
servers.58

50

See id. ¶¶ 578–84; PONTIASTOWSKI, supra note 48.
Microsoft, EC Decision, supra note 2, ¶ 297.
52
Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 WL 2693858 ¶ 140 (Sept. 17, 2007).
53
Id. ¶ 233.
54
Id. ¶ 140.
55
Id. ¶¶ 199–200.
56
Microsoft, EC Decision, supra note 2, ¶¶ 719 & 721.
57
Id. ¶ 221.
58
See Minutes of Proceedings, Day Three, Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 WL
2693858, Court of First Instance of the Eur. Communities, Apr. 26, 2006, at 18 [hereinafter Minutes of
CFI Proceedings, Day Three] (“What we are seeing in the blue bubble here is that they will all be twins.
They will have identical logic. Each makes assumptions about the way other servers will work.”).
51
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Image 1: Microsoft’s diagram illustrating the “blue bubble” argument before the Court of First Instance.
Active Directory uses a technique called “multi-master replication,”
which allows hundreds of domain controllers (or master directory servers),
distributed in a network that may span continents, to synchronize their operations by exchanging updates through the most efficient routes using
server-to-server protocols. To accomplish this function, however, each
server must independently build and continually update a map or topology
of the network. According to Shewchuk, only domain controllers with the
same internal logic can make efficient assumptions about what other Active
Directory servers will do when, for example, one server fails and the others
must pick up its functions.59 Consequently, merely disclosing the protocols
and specifications that servers within the blue bubble use would not allow a
non-Microsoft server to function as a domain controller, as the EC required;
Microsoft would have to disclose its proprietary algorithms. As Shewchuk
put it, “[i]n order for me to have someone work with me inside the service
boundary, they would need to have this same algorithm. That would mean I
would have to explain to them how to create this map when they saw this
information.”60
59

See id. at 42–44.
See id. at 44–45. As the CFI understood the argument, “in order for a domain control running
under a non-Microsoft work group server operating system to be capable of being placed in a ‘blue bub60
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Tridgell responded at the hearings that “[w]hat the blue bubble represents is a bubble of secrecy. The protocols used inside that blue bubble are
exactly the same in nature as the protocols used in other parts of Microsoft’s Active Directory infrastructure.”61 Because of the ubiquity of Active
Directory on large corporate networks, the secrecy of its protocols gives
Microsoft “a massive amount of leverage over its competitors.”62 By implication, Tridgell claimed that Samba could achieve the necessary level of interoperability by protocol analysis alone. Samba co-founder Jeremy
Allison has said that the Samba project has never reverse-engineered any
Windows code but has used across-the-wire network protocol analysis to
implement unique work-alike code.63 Evidently, the Samba team believes it
can emulate Active Directory domain control functions using the same
techniques.
The CFI found that Microsoft had failed to prove that the mandated
disclosures concerning Active Directory would require it to facilitate cloning, in the sense of a detailed copy of its implementations.64 It qualified that
conclusion, however, by observing that “Microsoft would not be required to
give any information about the implementation of [the inter-site topology]
algorithm in its work group server operating systems, but could merely give
a general description of [the] algorithm, leaving it to its competitors to develop their own implementation of it.”65 This “general description” exception has potentially radical implications for the implementation of Samba
license. As we show below, Microsoft has sought to comply with this provision by disclosing “Windows behaviors” associated with each protocol.
Remarkably, the CFI also asserted that a rival server company
would have no “interest in merely reproducing Windows work group server operating systems”:
Once they are able to use the information communicated to them to develop systems that are sufficiently interoperable with the Windows domain
architecture, they will have no other choice, if they wish to take advantage
of a competitive advantage over Microsoft and maintain a profitable
presence on the market, than to differentiate their products from Microsoft’s products with respect to certain parameters and certain features.66
ble’ composed of domain controllers using a Windows work group server operating system employing
Active Directory, those different operating systems must share the same internal logic.” Case T-201/04,
Microsoft Corp., 2007 WL 2693858 ¶ 262.
61
Minutes of Proceedings, Day Four, Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 WL
2693858, Court of First Instance of the Eur. Communities, Apr. 27, 2006, at 11–12 [hereinafter Minutes
of CFI Proceedings, Day Four].
62
Id.
63
See id.
64
Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp., 2007 WL 2693858 ¶¶ 263–64.
65
Id. ¶ 265.
66
Id. ¶ 658. By contrast, Judge Kollar-Kotelly in the U.S. case defined cloning as “creation of a
piece of software which replicates the functions of another piece of software, even if the replication is

http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2008/16/

342

NO RT HW E ST E R N U NI VE RSI T Y L AW RE VI E W C O L L OQ UY

In offering this argument, the CFI seemed to have ignored Samba,67
which maintains its presence in the market without profit. Were its products to achieve perfect functional equivalence with Microsoft’s, they
would sweep the field because Microsoft’s products have a positive price
and Samba’s are free.
C. The Kroes-Ballmer Settlement
Particularly in the latter stages of the European case, it became clear
that a primary goal of the EC was to require Microsoft to offer a license that
open source developers could use. On October 22, 2007, about a month after the decision of the Court of First Instance, the EC’s antitrust commissioner, Neelie Kroes reached an agreement68 with Microsoft’s CEO Steve
Ballmer that would require Microsoft to license its intellectual property,
other than patents, for a nominal one-time fee of €10,000, and its patents for
modest per-unit royalties.69 On October 24, 2007, Microsoft posted revised
licenses for interoperability under its WSPP Development Agreements to
reflect the Kroes-Ballmer agreement.70 Commentators and members of the
free and open source community complained, however, that the terms were
still incompatible with the GPL, the standard open source license employed
by Samba and many others.71 Because competitors and open source developers of workgroup server products generally rely on the Samba engine and
the GPLv3 license, they regarded the new WSPP license as useless.72 Furthermore, they argued that the €10,000 flat fee and particularly the royaltyaccomplished by some means other than the literal repetition of the same source code. In most instances,
where a clone is created without a copyright violation, the clone emerges from a process of reverse engineering—which consists of the study of functionality in the original product and the attempt to produce a product which accomplishes the same end.” See New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d
76, 175–76 (D.D.C. 2002). This sort of cloning would provide Microsoft’s rivals a “windfall” by allowing them to short-circuit the expensive process of reverse engineering. See id.
67
The passage also ignores IBM, Sun, Oracle, and others, who sell service ancillary to Samba,
for example, like consulting services, hardware, and database software. See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp., 2007 WL 2693858 ¶¶ 258–65.
68
Charles Forelle, Microsoft Yields in EU Antitrust Battle, WALL ST. J., October 23, 2007, at A3,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119304824519766949.html (link).
69
See Lohr & O’Brien, supra note 5 (discussing the fact that the the royalties were limited to a
maximum of 0.4% of revenue from products sold using the patented technology).
70
See
Microsoft
Work
Group
Server
Protocol
Program,
http://www.microsoft.com/about/legal/intellectualproperty/protocols/wspp/wspp.mspx (last visited May
30, 2008) (link).
71
See, e.g., Microsoft Posts the New License Terms for Interoperability in the EU Agreement—
Updated, GROKLAW, Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.groklaw.net/article.php?story=2007102408501134
(link); Vaughan Nichols, supra note 9. In a recent communication, Microsoft’s Craig Shank suggested
that many of these criticisms were “based on misunderstanding of the operation of the agreements as
drafted. . . . That said, we clarified many of those issues in the agreement with Samba just to help reduce the friction—even if born of misunderstanding rather than substance.” E-mail from Craig Shank to
authors (Mar. 19, 2008) (on file with authors).
72
See GROKLAW, supra note 70.
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bearing patent license would discourage use by small free and open source
development teams, which typically have no operating budget.73 Members
of the Samba team were also concerned about potential liability for patent
infringement.74 Because of all these concerns, the Free Software Foundation and Samba complained to Microsoft about the new terms.
Microsoft agreed to enter a new round of negotiations in order to make
the WSPP license terms more amenable to free and open source projects.75
These negotiations were initially brokered by EU trustee Neil Barrett, who
introduced the free and open source parties to Craig Shank of Microsoft.76
Barrett’s mediation efforts were important, but raised questions because the
CFI decision had held that the EC’s reliance on an expert trustee to implement the agreements was inconsistent with EC law.77 Neither Microsoft’s
representatives nor Samba’s could fully explain to us how Barrett remained
in place. Evidently, however, the EC interpreted the CFI’s decision as restricting only the trustee’s remuneration and some other formal aspects of
his relationship to the commission. Whatever the reason, Barrett facilitated
the negotiations that eventually produced the Microsoft-Samba agreement.
III. THE MICROSOFT-SAMBA AGREEMENT
On December 20, 2007, the Protocol Freedom Information Foundation78 (PFIF) and Microsoft Corporation agreed (the WSPP/No Patents
agreement) that Microsoft would license, on terms friendly to open source
developers like Samba, all of the protocols disclosed under the ongoing
American and European protocol licensing programs.79 The Software Freedom Law Center (SFLC)80 created the PFIF as a nonprofit Delaware corporation to hold the master license and to license the documentation to free or
open source developers.81 The PFIF paid Microsoft a one-time royalty fee
of €10,000.82 The agreement provides a royalty-free83 copyright and trade
73

Id.
See
Andrew
Tridgell,
The
PFIF
Agreement,
December
20,
2007,
http://samba.org/samba/PFIF/PFIF_agreement.html (link) [hereinafter Tridgell, PFIF Agreement].
75
See Andrew Tridgell, Samba, Freeing Up the Windows Workgroup Protocols, December 20,
2007, http://samba.org/samba/PFIF/PFIF_history.html (link) [hereinafter Tridgell, Freeing Up Windows
Workgroup Protocols].
76
See Shank Interview, supra note 7.
77
See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 WL 2693858 ¶ 1278 (Sept. 17, 2007).
78
See PFIF Home Page, http://www.protocolfreedom.org (last visited May 30, 2008) (link).
79
See Microsoft Work Group Server Protocol Program License Agreement (No Patents) for Development and Product Distribution, Exhibit A (citing App 1, Table 1) [hereinafter WSPP No Patents
Agreement], available at http://www.protocolfreedom.org/PFIF_agreement.pdf (last visited May 30,
2008) (link).
80
For a description of the SFLC’s activities, see its home page, http://www.softwarefreedom.org/
(last visited May 30, 2008) (link).
81
See Tridgell, PFIF Agreement, supra note 74.
82
See id.
74
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secret license permitting liberal use of the protocols and documentation,
subject to confidentiality and non-disclosure restrictions.84 In this Part, we
describe the negotiations and the terms of the agreement from the perspectives of both sides.
A. Negotiating in the Shadow of the CFI Decision
In Microsoft’s view, the CFI decision meant the arguments about disclosures were “over” and Microsoft was bound to comply.85 The agreement
between Ballmer and Kroes, if not unconditional surrender, was a capitulation with only minimal concessions from the EC for the protection of Microsoft’s most basic intellectual property. One indication of how Microsoft
viewed the matter was its appointment of Craig Shank, an experienced
transactional lawyer and business development executive, to head the negotiations.86 Shank took it as his goal to comply, despite the tension between
the EC’s requirements that Microsoft disclose (a) only the specifications of
its protocols, yet (b) enough to allow a rival server to function exactly like a
Microsoft server within the blue bubble.87 Thus, Shank was prepared to
disclose more than the specifications to the extent necessary to achieve the
requisite degree of interoperability.88
According to Samba’s attorney Eben Moglen, Samba took a very different view of the negotiations.89 The Samba team was disappointed by the
EC’s haste to “cash in” its CFI victory for the seeming political gain of a
deal with Microsoft, and resented the pressure it placed on them to come to
terms. They disagreed particularly with Kroes’s decision to allow Microsoft to charge a running royalty for its software patents.90 The Samba team
is ideologically opposed to software patents, a view not shared by the intellectual property section at the EC, which regards patents as essential to innovation.91 Despite Samba’s reservations about the terms of the KroesBallmer settlement, its engineers still believed that the disclosures would be
extraordinarily useful to them in protocol analysis. However, they also
feared that the EC at some point would lose interest in Microsoft’s actions
in the server market and become less willing to insist that Microsoft come
to terms. These factors all placed pressure on Samba to reach agreement on
a license.92
83

That is, there is no per-copy royalty charged for use of disclosed protocols. There was, as mentioned, a one-time royalty fee of €10,000 that was paid by the PFIF.
84
See Tridgell, Freeing Up Windows Workgroup Protocols, supra note 75.
85
See Shank Interview, supra note 7.
86
See id.
87
See id.
88
Id.
89
Moglen Interview, supra note 7.
90
See id.; Tridgell, Freeing Up Windows Workgroup Protocols, supra note 75.
91
See Moglen Interview, supra note 7.
92
See id.
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Negotiations began in mid-October.93 The initial drafts of license
agreements that Samba reviewed were based on the Workgroup Server Protocol Program license that Microsoft had created under EC regulation, but
that the EC staff had redlined in an effort to comply with GPLv3.94 This
approach, Moglen believed, produced drafts that were slanted in Microsoft’s favor and that included inapplicable royalty schedules and incomplete
attachments, all of which hindered the negotiation process. Nevertheless,
the EC made clear that it wanted the Samba team to reach a deal with Microsoft by Christmas. The pace of the negotiations picked up when Tridgell
proposed to Barrett and Shank that Samba’s engineers speak directly to
their engineering and business counterparts at Microsoft. Moglen was surprised to find that Microsoft’s engineers and its protocol licensing team
were both willing to talk and remarkably forthcoming. Tridgell and Shank
(in his business capacity) then conducted discussions as lead negotiators,
with the lawyers staying out of the way to the extent possible. The engineers overcame some sticking points and proposed terms streamlining administration of the disclosure process.
Interestingly, Microsoft’s
competitors became aware of the negotiations, and contacted Moglen to
lobby for terms they wanted to see incorporated in the deal. Samba’s negotiators, however, tried to remain independent.95
B. The Terms of the Agreement
The December 20 final agreement permits free open source developers,
through the PFIF, to gain access to the relevant WSPP documentation subject to the agreement’s non-disclosure terms.96 Tridgell identified several
terms as being of particular importance to the Samba team: patent exclusions, quick expiration of non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), and exception of source code comments from NDA liability.97
Like the original WSPP/No Patents agreement, the Samba license does
not grant licenses to any of Microsoft’s patents.98 The GPLv3 requires any
code distributed under that license to be entirely free of patents, or to provide a patent license compatible with the GPL.99 Since Samba is licensed
under the GPLv3, it was essential that the Microsoft license provide some
means of avoiding infringement.100 The Samba team was particularly wor93

See id.
See id.
95
Id.
96
See WSPP No Patents Agreement, supra note 79, § 2.1(b).
97
See Tridgell, PFIF Agreement, supra note 74.
98
See id.
99
See Brett Smith, A Quick Guide to GPLv3, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/quick-guide-gplv3.html
(link) (“Whenever someone conveys software covered by GPLv3 that they’ve written or modified, they
must provide every recipient with any patent licenses necessary to exercise the rights that the GPL gives
them.”).
100
See Tridgell, PFIF Agreement, supra note 74.
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ried that their development efforts would infringe unknown patents, which
Microsoft could then use to block distribution.101 To their surprise, however, Microsoft was willing to list, as an appendix to the agreement, all of
the patents it claimed in the licensed information.102 Microsoft agreed not to
sue any Samba licensee or end-user for infringement of an unlisted patent
on account of their development, use, or distribution of the portions of
Samba that implement the licensed protocols.103 The provision allows Samba, by successfully designing around all of the patents shown in the appendix, to comply with the GPLv3 and to guarantee its users freedom from
potential infringement liability for their use of the covered portions of Samba. Craig Shank described this aspect of the agreement as the “patent map,”
part of an overall package of solutions to patent issues for both open source
developers and commercial developers. The package includes the patent
map, the stand-alone patent license, and Microsoft’s “noncommercial patent
pledge.”104 While the patent exclusion may make the license less helpful to
some developers, the Samba team members actually expressed a preference
to avoid using patented software entirely by designing around it.105 In a recent podcast interview, Jeremy Allison described software patents as “pure
evil,” but also usually “pure rubbish” and easy to design around.106 Faith in
the ability to design around patents appears to be a core element of open
source ideology.
There were also two concerns about the effects of the non-disclosure
agreements. First, the Samba team was concerned that potential licensees
would be dissuaded from taking advantage of the program because of fears
that non-disclosure limitations would diminish their employment opportunities.107 As a result, the new licensing terms provide for the expiration of
those non-disclosure requirements addressing information that a developer
“retain[s] in unaided memory,” three months after he or she discontinues

101

Id.; see also Moglen Interview, supra note 7.
See WSPP No Patents Agreement, supra note 79, app. 4.
103
See Tridgell, PFIF Agreement, supra note 74.
104
See Shank Interview, supra note 7. For the text of the pledge, see Microsoft Work Group Server
Protocol
Program,
Patent
Pledge
for
Open
Source
Developers,
http://www.microsoft.com/about/legal/intellectualproperty/protocols/wspp/wspp.mspx (last visited May
30, 2008) (link).
105
See Moglen Interview, supra note 7.
106
See
Interview
by
Don
Marti
with
Jeremy
Allison,
LinuxWorld,
http://www.linuxworld.com/podcasts/linux/2007/122007-linuxcast.html (December 20, 2007) (podcast)
[hereinafter Allison Interview] (link). On the other hand, some reports suggest that the Samba team
would have preferred that the EC require Microsoft to provide royalty-free licenses for use by open
source projects. Allison makes at least one comment in the podcast expressing marginal disappointment
in the patent licensing scheme. Less ambiguously, Andrew Tridgell is quoted on the Samba site saying,
“we were disappointed the decision did not address the issue of patent claims over the protocols.” See
Samba and the PFIF, http://samba.org/samba/PFIF/ (last visited June 10, 2008) (link).
107
See Moglen Interview, supra note 7.
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using the WSPP information.108 Second, the NDA provisions as originally
drafted would have forbidden reproduction of the disclosure information.109
The Samba team thought this requirement might restrain developers’ ability
to include comments in their source code explaining how the code works
because of fears that the comments might later be found to violate the
NDA.110 Comments are important to open source development because
they can provide useful information about the code in natural language, and
thus allow the loose network of open source developers to communicate.
The final revision of § 5.8 of the agreement excludes source code comments
from liability under the NDA.111
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF THE SAMBA LICENSE
It is too early in the implementation of the disclosure process to say
with certainty what effects it will have on the parties and competition.
There is reason to believe, however, that this license will be more consequential than any implemented under the U.S. final judgments. Both parties
to the agreement may benefit in some respects. It is also likely that the new
protocol information will improve interoperability. But the longer-term
consequences of the disclosures are less clear. If the disclosures are limited
to “specifications” of protocols and general descriptions of Windows functions, they may not allow Samba to achieve functional equivalence within
the blue bubble, as the EC and the CFI anticipated. If, on the other hand,
the disclosures go beyond any reasonable definition of specifications in order to permit that level of interoperability, the program may facilitate cloning and thus the devaluation of Microsoft’s core intellectual property. In
this section, we consider the implications of the program for each of the
parties and for antitrust policy.
A. Samba
As we have explained at greater length elsewhere, the documentation
of protocols under the U.S. final judgments has been an arduous process,
with few apparent benefits in the market.112 Nevertheless, those most closely involved in that process agree that the quality of the documentation of the
protocols after the watershed “reset” in the spring of 2006 has markedly
improved.113 The Technical Committee continues to test that documentation

108

See WSPP No Patents Agreement, supra note 79, § 5.5.
See Moglen Interview, supra note 7.
110
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See WSPP No Patents Agreement, supra note 79, § 5.8.
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See Page & Childers, supra note 13.
113
See Shank Interview, supra note 7; see also Joint Status Report on Microsoft’s Compliance with
the Final Judgments at 4, United States v. Microsoft Corp., (D.D.C. filed Mar. 6, 2007) (No. 98-132
(CKK)), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f221700/221759.pdf (link) (“The [Technical
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by developing its own prototype implementations,114 but Microsoft asserts
that the documentation is already sufficient for any practical commercial
development by its licensees.115
Samba may stand to benefit from protocol disclosures more than any
other company because its methodology depends on protocol analysis and
test-driven development. According to Samba co-founder Jeremy Allison,
Samba’s development methods differ from those of Microsoft.116 Samba
begins by developing client-side code, which it uses to test against Windows server products to ensure that the implementation is correct. When
the client code tests properly, the Samba team uses it to develop and test a
server implementation that behaves exactly like a Windows server product.
Samba uses network protocol analysis to define an accurate set of specifications that its server products must meet. Samba thus has a development advantage over Microsoft in that it has the Windows server as a known
benchmark. Samba’s test-driven development can focus on the purely functional aspects of the software.117
Samba’s development methods should allow the Samba team to take
full advantage of Microsoft’s disclosures. Allison says a Microsoft engineer once warned him, “the worst thing we could do is dump our documentation on you because then you’d be as confused as we are.”118
Nevertheless, Allison said the Samba team looks forward to receiving the
documentation, particularly now that the documentation has been improved
by the reset process under the U.S. enforcement program. Upon receipt of
the documentation, Allison said, the Samba team will begin to write clientside tests against the disclosed protocols. Once complete, they will run
those tests against Windows servers to prove the accuracy of the disclosed
protocols. They will report to Microsoft any problems encountered in im-

Committee]’s initial review of the Milestone 2 documents suggests that their overall quality is meaningfully higher than that of the Milestone 1 documents”).
114
See Joint Status Report on Microsoft’s Compliance with the Final Judgments, supra note 113, at
2–6.
115
Id. at 14–15 (stating that Microsoft is “unaware of any existing or potential licensee that has
been unable to use any Communications Protocol because of flaws in the documentation”).
116
See Allison Interview, supra note 106 (describing how the Samba team will use the protocol documentation in its continuing development).
117
Id. Samba developers encode all their knowledge about a specific protocol into a test suite. Id.
Each protocol or set of protocols has its own tests. Id. When a bug is reported about Samba from an
end-user, the Samba team repairs the faulty code on the server side, and then writes test code that codifies the “weird behavior” that led to the bug in the first place. Id. This ensures that the use scenario that
caused the bug is preserved for all future version releases of Samba. Id. These individual tests are combined into a gigantic test process that can be run against the current build of Samba by execution of a
“MAKE TEST” command. Id. This runs the full test suite (referred to as the “regression suite”) on the
latest build of the Samba server. Id. Samba utilizes world-wide build farms that run the tests on a variety of hardware platforms. Id.
118
Id.
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plementing the client-side test suites as errors in the documentation.119
Once the client-side test code is running properly against a Microsoft server, the Samba team will either run it against a Samba server (in the case of
already-implemented protocols) or write server-side code for that protocol,
which they can then test against the client-side test suite. An iterative process of rewriting, bug-fixing, and re-testing will occur until the Samba server
responds to the client-side test code in a way that is identical to the response
given by a Windows server. Allison hopes that the protocol disclosures will
lead to more robust client-side test code and better documented Samba internals. These improvements might attract new developers who are not
specialists in protocol analysis and who can devote their efforts to other aspects of Samba within their expertise.120
Allison said that Samba already has a prototype implementation of Active Directory, available for download as Samba version 4.121 He claimed
that “if [the disclosures are] any good,” they should help the Samba team
deliver a “second source” Active Directory suite sooner than they otherwise
would. He expresses a “realistic” view that the new documentation will only be a starting point—the substantial portion of the work remains in the
form of writing client-side test code, and filing bug reports with Microsoft.
The Samba team has expressed enthusiasm for the tools Microsoft has developed to analyze protocols under the U.S. licensing program.122 The most
important of these is Microsoft’s NetMon, or network monitor, with an
NPL (network protocol language) plug-in.123 This device allows engineers
to change protocol description in real time as the protocol streams across
the network.124 These devices will assist Samba in its own protocol analysis.125
Allison’s comments about using the protocol disclosures to help implement Active Directory might be considered optimistic. On the other
hand, Craig Shank suggested that Microsoft took seriously its obligation to
make protocol disclosures sufficient to allow Samba to implement a version
of Active Directory that is fully interoperable.126 Thus, those disclosures
could require more than specifications of protocols.
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See id. Of course, this raises the possibility that the point of failure is in the licensee’s inability
to implement the protocol as a test suite. However, in the case of the Samba team’s principals, this is
somewhat unlikely, and errors reported as a result of this process will likely have merit. See id.
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B. Microsoft
When parties contract, the law normally assumes that the contract will
increase the wealth of both parties, at least ex ante because each is free to
walk away from the bargaining table.127 That presumption does not necessarily follow when one of the parties is required to contract on regulated
terms. Because of the extraordinary strictures the EC and CFI decisions
placed on Microsoft, we cannot predict how the arrangement will affect Microsoft or competition.
The EC has required Microsoft to make disclosures sufficient to allow
rivals to create server software functionally equivalent to Microsoft, what
Shank calls a “drop-in replacement server.”128 But the EC also insisted that
its order would not require Microsoft to disclose any of its internal Windows server code, although it may be required to give a “general description” of some of its algorithms. Microsoft believes these positions are not
consistent because portions of the server code within Shewchuk’s “blue
bubble” diagram, particularly the Active Directory suite, require perfect integration between Windows servers in order to function properly. Labeling
and explanation of the data bytes transmitted in a certain protocol, according to Microsoft, cannot achieve this level of integration. Thus, the documentation must also include what Shank described as “Windows
behaviors.” These disclosures would include information in the form of
explanatory text, pseudo-code, or similar descriptions of algorithms Microsoft uses in implementing the protocol wherever such information is
thought necessary for interoperability. Thus, the purpose of these “Windows behaviors” is to assist competitors in producing a drop-in replacement
server, without revealing Microsoft’s proprietary internals, which presumably embody all of Microsoft’s competitive advantage.129 Because Microsoft
has now published all of the protocols covered by the license,130 technical
readers can examine both the specifications and the associated Windows
behaviors that Samba is receiving.131
Whether these disclosures will be sufficient is unclear. It may be the
EC will ultimately require Microsoft to disclose its servers’ formulas, work127
See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Bargaining and Monopolization: In Search of the
“Boundary of Section 2 Liability” Between Aspen and Trinko, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 115, 124–26 (2005).
128
Shank Interview, supra note 7.
129
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http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc197979.aspx (last visited May 30, 2008) (link).
131
To view the MS-SAMR protocol, see Microsoft Developer Network, Security Account Manager
(SAM) Remote Protocol Specification (Client-to-Server), http://msdn2.microsoft.com/enus/library/cc211750.aspx (last visited May 30, 2008). This specification includes, among other data, the
Interface Description Language (IDL) for the protocol. See id. at Appendix A: Full IDL,
http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc212092.aspx (last visited May 30, 2008); id. at Appendix B:
Windows Behavior, http://msdn2.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc212098.aspx (last visited May 30,
2008).
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flows, and other elements that, although not literally source code, functionally make up the internal logic of the source code. When asked, Shank admitted that he has been “kept awake nights” worrying about whether
anything less than a clone would be sufficient to satisfy the Commission’s
evidentiary requirement of a drop-in replacement server.132 As if to confirm
Shank’s concerns, Moglen suggested that Samba’s goal is to “commoditize
the domain server.”133 When David Heiner of Microsoft was told of this
goal, he responded, “I know. Everything we sell, they want to distribute for
free.”134
Of course, Samba would not agree with the characterization of the
product they envision as a clone of Windows server software. They believe
it will be a superior product. Samba’s goal is to encapsulate the network
domain controller in a $50 disposable appliance and commoditize domain
services, as well as file storage (network storage devices) and print services
(dedicated printer servers).135 Samba thinks Microsoft will then copy Samba’s Active Directory implementation because it will be technically superior.136 If Samba succeeds in this regard, Microsoft could find itself
relegated to the position of other server developers, building on Samba as
an infrastructure and profiting by offering value-added services like administration tools.
Despite the obvious risks to Microsoft’s business plan that the disclosures pose, there is some reason to believe there may be compensating benefits. Moglen said that the Samba team found Microsoft eager to get lots of
information into Samba’s hands.137 Moglen suggested that Microsoft may
have changed its mind about the value of competing implementations, and
that Microsoft sees some commercial benefit accruing from Samba’s success. Moglen suggested, for example, that the growth of Samba will spread
Microsoft’s protocols, increasing the “mind share” Microsoft’s products
hold among developers. Heiner said that he had heard similar arguments
from EC staff: Microsoft is a platform company and thus will benefit from
the spread of its platform.138 Heiner is skeptical of this argument, with good
reason. Heiner observed that Microsoft clearly had made a different business judgment over the past few years. Under the terms of the EC decree,
Microsoft must license its protocols, without patents, for essentially nothing, and license the patents in its protocols for a nominal amount. Samba
itself is free and competes directly with functionality in Windows. Thus, it
132
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is not entirely clear how Microsoft can profit from the platform benefits of
the expansion of Samba, other than, perhaps, by being in a good position to
sell add-on services.
Moglen also suggested that Microsoft could gain by commoditization
in network storage appliances that use Samba.139 Network storage is a
growing need in network architecture. More available, and cheaper, storage
compatible with Microsoft’s server software could expand market share for
Microsoft. These developments might hurt competitors like EMC, particularly its VMware virtualizer division. Thus, low-cost hardware appliances
produced by small startups incorporating Samba in their devices might
drive bigger competing software vendors out of the market, and thus benefit
Microsoft.
Apart from possible competitive benefits, Samba believes Microsoft
will derive technical benefits from the relationship. Moglen predicted that
Microsoft Server 2008 will face as many technical difficulties as Vista has
on the client side.140 The relationship with Samba could help address some
of those problems. In his podcast interview, Jeremy Allison commented
that Microsoft requested and has received Samba’s test suite to use in its
own development.141 It may be that Microsoft is using the test suites to improve its protocol documentation in its mandated disclosures. It is also possible, however, that Microsoft is finding the suites useful in the
development of its own server products themselves. The results of Samba’s
protocol tests are likely to be more useful and mature than feedback Microsoft may have received from licensees or other third parties in the past.
Moglen also suggested that Microsoft may benefit from better documentation of its protocols under the program.142 Moglen expressed surprise
that Microsoft had not fully documented its protocols internally, requiring
its developers to work only from application programming interfaces.
Thus, according to Moglen, Microsoft does not understand its own protocols because of either an obsessive need for secrecy or organizational entropy.143 To the extent that collaboration with Samba produces better
documentation, tools, and understanding, Microsoft engineers can in turn
produce better code and enhance its ability to innovate.
The suggestions of possible mutual benefit to the development efforts
of both Microsoft and Samba raise the issue of whether the program might
evolve into a kind of unacknowledged joint venture to develop parallel, if
not joint, products. Given the radical cultural and economic differences between the two enterprises, this possibility seems remote. Nevertheless, it is
fair to say that the benefits of the program will not all be in one direction.
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CONCLUSION
The protocol licensing program under the final judgments in the
American Microsoft case has been costly and unrelated to market needs.144
That program has produced very few licensees of any kind and none that
promise to evolve into a platform rival of Microsoft. The Samba license
formed under the order in the European Microsoft case, in contrast, is both
significant and perilous for global antitrust policy. It provides critical
protocols and documentation to Microsoft’s most important rival in the
server market, a rival, moreover, whose development methods are focused
on the analysis of those very protocols. Samba is thus more likely to put
the disclosures to effective competitive use than any other licensee. The
long-run peril is that the disclosures will go beyond the “specifications” that
the CFI contemplated, and will allow Samba to clone Microsoft’s
proprietary algorithms. That result, although reducing prices in the short
run, would inhibit dynamic competition by undermining the incentives of
leading firms to innovate.
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